Critics of the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s loss contingency disclosure proposal compare the troubled history of its FIN 48, which came into effect at the end of 2006, as a guide to the difficulties inherent in the board’s loss contingency proposal.
FIN 48, like the loss contingency proposal, dealt with future uncertainties by dictating how companies should account for uncertain tax positions. It requires corporations to disclose their reserves in the event that tax officials disagree with some of the company’s tax treatments. The difficulties with the ensuing calculation are analogous to those under the loss contingency proposal.
To begin with, companies must assume that they will be audited. They must then calculate the odds of their tax decisions holding up. It’s not unlike companies facing potential litigation or litigation in its early stages who must do what amounts to nothing less than handicapping their chances of success.
Indeed, many observers believe that FIN 48 disclosures are by themselves so uncertain that they have proven to be little help to investors.
Before FIN 48, companies kept their tax strategies and assumptions to themselves, either for fear of waving red flags at the IRS or of having any weaknesses in their strategy thrown back at them in court.
As it turns out, FIN 48 has been so controversial that at press time, FASB had delayed extending it to private companies for the second time in two years.