In 2003, in the case of Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003), the Delaware Supreme Court held that stockholder voting agreements “negotiated as part of a merger agreement, which guaranteed shareholder approval of the merger if put to a vote, coupled with a merger agreement that both lacked a fiduciary out and contained a Section 251(c) provision requiring the board to submit the merger to a shareholder vote, constituted a coercive and preclusive defensive device,” because it made the merger an “impermissible fait accompli.” The Omnicare decision was issued by a divided Supreme Court (3-2), rare in Delaware, and the case has been controversial ever since.
The principal reasons for the controversy were that the Omnicare board of directors did not have any conflicts of interest and they shopped the company prior to entering into a merger agreement. The lack of identifiable breaches of the duties of loyalty and care, coupled with Delaware’s tradition of permitting stockholders to vote their stock in their interest provided they are not harming the minority in a self-interested transaction, left many practitioners with the belief that the case was wrongly decided. The makeup of the Delaware Supreme Court has changed since 2003 and then-Justice Myron T. Steele, who was part of the Omnicare dissent, is now chief justice. Yet, because practitioners counsel clients to avoid Omnicare situations, the Delaware Supreme Court has not had occasion to revisit the issue and perhaps reverse its prior holding.
After engaging in a robust search for potential buyers, OPENLANE and KAR entered into a merger agreement on Aug. 11, 2011. This required OPENLANE to obtain stockholder approval of the merger quickly and gave KAR’s board of directors the right to terminate the agreement without paying a termination fee if approval was not received within 24 hours. OPENLANE ultimately received consent from the holders of a majority of its stock within 24 hours of the execution of the merger agreement.
The plaintiff alleged that OPENLANE’s board of directors breached its fiduciary duties by failing to engage in an adequate process to sell the company and also challenged the deal protection measures in the merger agreement, relying on Omnicare. As noted, the merger agreement’s no-solicitation covenant did not contain a fiduciary out and OPENLANE’s directors and executive officers held more than 68 percent of the company’s outstanding stock, giving them more than sufficient voting power to approve the merger. The plaintiff alleged that these were improper defensive devices similar to those in Omnicare because they made the deal a fait accompli.
Importantly, the court acknowledged that Omnicare could be read to require a fiduciary out in every merger agreement. The court explained further, however, that when a board enters into a merger agreement that does not contain a fiduciary out, “it is not at all clear that the court should automatically enjoin the merger when no superior offer has emerged,” noting that such a decision “is a perilous endeavor because there is always the possibility that the existing deal will vanish, denying stockholders the opportunity to accept any transaction.”
Also noteworthy is the court’s conclusion that the board made a reasonable effort to maximize stockholders, and therefore satisfied its obligations under Revlon, even though the board did not obtain a fairness opinion and did not reach out to any financial buyers. That conclusion is a reaffirmation of Delaware precedent that “[t]here is no single path that a board must follow in order to maximize stockholder value, but directors must follow a path of reasonableness which leads toward that end.”